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FETAL TISSUE RESEARCH: STATE
REGULATION OF THE DONATION OF
ABORTED FETUSES WITHOUT THE
CONSENT OF THE "MOTHER"
CHRISTIE A. SEIFERT*

INTRODUCTION

Much controversy surrounds the issue of fetal tissue experimentation on voluntarily aborted fetuses for the purpose of medical research and advancement. 1 This controversy involves many
legal, ethical and moral dilemmas.' Among these dilemmas is the
question of whether the law should permit a woman who decides
to abort a fetus to subsequently consent to fetal tissue research on
that fetus.'
Prior to 1985, hospitals performing abortions used a general
consent form which gave them permission to dispose of the fetal
remains in an appropriate manner.' During this time, the issues
* J.D. Candidate, January 1999.
1. See Nikki M. C. Bell, Regulating Transfer and Use of Fetal Tissue in
TransplantationProcedures: The Ethical Dimensions, 20 AM. J.L. & MED.
277, 278 (1994). Abortion is controversial and is the major constraint in the
use of fetal tissue in medical research. Id. Anti-abortionists fear abortion will
remain permanently legal if aborted tissues become medically useful and

beneficial to society. Id. at 282.
2. Nicolas P. Terry, 'Alas! Poor Yorick,' I Knew Him Ex Utero: The Regulation of Embryo and Fetal Experimentation and Disposal in England and the

United States, 39 VAND. L. REV. 419, 425 (1986). Fetal research involves
"difficult ethical, philosophical and legal questions regarding both our response to indicia of life and our legal definition of personhood." Id. Fetal tissue experimentation exacerbates the fear of anti-abortionists as did the decision in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), because they may encourage more
women to undertake abortions with the hopes of increasing the supply of fetuses for medical research. Id.
3. Gregory Gelfand & Toby R. Levin, Fetal Tissue Research: Legal Regulation of Human Fetal Tissue Transplantation,50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 647,

676 (1993). Allowing an aborting woman to consent to the organ retrieval
from a fetus is problematic since the aborting woman, in most cases, chose to
deny life to the fetus. Id. Some critics believe that an aborting woman waives
her right to determine the disposition of a fetus once she elects to have the
fetus aborted. Id.
4. Bell, supra note 1, at 289. Hospitals normally disposed of the fetal remains by cremation and burial. Id. Hospitals typically handled removed or-
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surrounding the disposal of fetal remains received little or no media attention.5 Since then, many hospitals, and some states, have
adopted protocol providing that the "mother"8 of the aborted fetus
ultimately retains the legal right to determine whether the
aborted fetus will be the subject of medical experimentation.7 The

Uniform Anatomical Gift Act (the "UAGA") 8 and various state9 and
federal'0 laws respecting fetal tissue research, essentially give the
mother this right." The UAGA recognizes an aborting woman's
right to determine the disposition of a fetus. 2 This recognition is
based on the theory that the aborting woman is in the best position
to consent to such research and no other plausible decision-maker
exists. 3
gans, removed tissues and amputated parts in the same manner. Id. Occasionally, hospitals transferred fetal tissue to researchers. Id.
5. Id.

6. Black's Law Dictionary defines "mother" as '[a] woman who has borne
a child. A female parent. The term includes maternity during the pre-birth
period." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1013 (6th ed. 1990).

7. Gelfand & Levin, supra note 3, at 676. The decisional authority regarding the donation of fetal tissue resulting from an elective abortion ultimately
rests with the woman aborting the fetus in accordance with the 1987 Uniform
Anatomical Gift Act. Id.
8. UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT §§ 1-17 (amended 1987), 8A U.L.A. 19-

132 (1993). Thirty-eight states have adopted the 1968 version of the UAGA.
See 8A U.L.A. 63 (setting forth jurisdictions that have adopted the 1968 version of the Act). Fifteen states have adopted the 1987 version. See 8A U.L.A.
19 (setting forth the jurisdictions that have adopted the 1987 version of the
Act).

9. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-17-802(b)(2) (Michie 1991) (providing
that "[nlo person shall perform any biomedical or behavioral research on any
fetus born dead as the result of a legal abortion, or on any fetal tissue produced by an abortion, without the permission of the mother").
10. See Protection of Human Subjects, Subpart B-Additional Protections
Pertaining to Research, Development, and Related Activities Involving Fetuses, Pregnant Women, and Human in Vitro Fertilization, 45 C.F.R. §
46.201(a)(i) (1996) (providing the federal regulations for fetal research financially supported by the Department of Health and Human Services).
11. See Gelfand & Levin, supra note 3, at 676 (discussing who possesses
the authority to donate a decedent's tissues or organs). After the mid-1970s,
many states hastily enacted fetal tissue research laws to prohibit fetal tissue
research. Gary L. Reback, Fetal Experimentation: Moral, Legal, and Medical
Implications, 26 STAN. L. REV. 1191, 1207 (1973). This deterred the growth of
fetal experimentation that occurred prior to the Supreme Court's decision in
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). Id. State legislatures incorporated the
majority of these laws into their abortion laws, applying them only to aborted
tissue. Marilyn J. Clapp, Note, State Prohibitionof Fetal Experimentation
and the FundamentalRight of Privacy, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1073, 1073 (1988).
12. Gelfand & Levin, supra note 3, at 680.
13. Id. The only "practical solution" in deciding the disposition of a fetus

for research purposes is for the government to give the decisional authority to
the aborting woman "as nature has." Id. The authors also state that although
an argument can be made for requiring the father's consent, especially if the
mother and father are married, little will be gained by requiring this paternal
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This Comment analyzes the ethical and legal aspects of the
donation of electively aborted fetuses for the purposes of fetal tissue research. It explores the reasoning behind lawmakers' decisions to vest the right of consent to fetal tissue research in aborting women. Moreover, this Comment examines various doctrines
and legal principles which are intertwined with the issue of
whether an aborting woman is indeed the best, or the only practical, person to consent to the disposition of an aborted fetus.
Part I discusses the history and purposes of fetal tissue research and the controversy surrounding this research. Part II presents an overview of the doctrine of informed consent and its inclusion in the UAGA relating to the donation of organs and tissues
for research purposes. Part III discusses the effect of the UAGA's
application to the donation of fetal tissue from elective abortions.
Part III further asserts that the language of the UAGA does not
effectively allow aborting women to consent to such donations.
Part IV proposes that state enacted legislation regulating fetal tissue research is a reasonable alternative to affording an aborting
woman the right to consent to the donation of fetal tissue for research purposes. In addition, Part IV argues that such legislation
will not affect the constitutional rights of an aborting woman.
I. HISTORY AND PURPOSES OF FETAL TISSUE RESEARCH AND
THE CONTROVERSY SURROUNDING THE RESEARCH
Scientists and medical practitioners have performed fetal tissue research for over fifty years. 4 Fetal tissue research shows
great potential for advancement in the treatment and cure of various diseases and in the area of tissue transplantation. 5 However,
much controversy surrounds this research because scientists obtain the majority of fetal tissue used in such research from elective
abortions."

consent. Id.
14. James E. Goddard, Comment, The NIH Revitalization Act of 1993
Washed Away Many Legal Problems with Fetal Tissue TransplantationResearch But a Stain Remains, 49 SMU L. REV. 375, 383 (1996). Scientists have
used fetal tissue for research in the United States since the 1930s. Id. However, it did not become the subject of public outcry until 1973 when Roe v.
Wade legalized abortion and "researchers decapitated a dozen live fetuses and
kept the fetal heads alive through artificial means." Id. (citing 410 U.S. 113
(1973)).
15. Id. at 381. Scientists promote and justify fetal tissue research because
they recognize its potential to cure and improve the life of persons suffering
from various diseases and disorders. Id. at 378.
16. Id. at 381. Researchers contend that it is essential that they use fetal
tissue obtained from elective abortions to increase the likelihood of successful
tissue transplantation. Id.
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A. History and Purposesof Fetal Tissue Research

Fetal tissue research played an enormous role in the development of both the polio and rubella vaccines. 17 Fetal tissue research has also been instrumental in developing and improving
various prenatal diagnostic tests including amniocentesis, 8 chorionic villus sampling,' 9 and ultrasound." Moreover, fetal tissue research proved to be beneficial to pregnant women,
couples wishing
2
to reproduce and even to the embryo itself. '
Today, medical researchers suggest that fetal tissue transplantation 22 may be useful in the cure or treatment of Alzheimer's
disease, Huntington's chorea, spinal chord injuries, diabetes, leukemia, Down's syndrome, Tay Sachs disease, epilepsy, cancer and
various other medical traumas.22 Because of this research, there is
a dramatic increase in the demand for fetal tissue. 2' Electively
aborted fetal tissue is most conducive to successful fetal tissue
17. Id. at 376. Scientists used human fetal kidney cells to develop the polio
vaccine. Id. at 377 n.4. Scientists also used fetal tissue to show that the rubella vaccine virus crossed the placenta to infect the fetus. Id. (citing Rachel
B. Gold & Dorothy Lehrman, Fetal Research Under Fire: The Influence of
Abortion Politics, FAM. PLAN. PERSP., Jan.-Feb. 1989, at 6-7).

18. Clapp, supra note 11, at 1086. Amniocentesis is a prenatal procedure
that "tests samples of fluid surrounding the fetus in utero." Id. at 1087 n.122.
19. Id. at 1087. Chorionic villus sampling is a prenatal procedure that
tests fetal cells for defects. Id. at 1087 n.125.
20. Id. at 1086. Ultrasound is a prenatal procedure that uses highfrequency sound waves to make images of the fetus in utero. Id. at 1087
n.121.
21. Lori B. Andrews, Regulation of Experimentation on the Unborn, 14 J.
LEGAL MED. 25, 27-28 (1993). An embryo or fetus can benefit from fetal tissue
experimentation through gene therapy or in utero surgery on the fetus itself.
Id. at 27. A pregnant woman can also benefit from this type of experimentation if she becomes ill during her pregnancy. Id. When a physician treats a
pregnant woman for an illness during her pregnancy, the treatment may in
fact have certain experimental effects on the fetus whereby the
"experimentation" on the fetus essentially becomes a by-product of the treatment on the ill, pregnant woman. Id. Lastly, couples benefit from fetal tissue
experimentation because the experimentation helps the couple further their
reproductive plans. Id. at 28. Scientists developed various prenatal tests as a
result of fetal tissue research. Id. The tests help couples decide whether to
initiate or continue a pregnancy. Id.
22. Goddard, supra note 14, at 378. Fetal tissue transplantation is a medical procedure in which surgeons take cells from the brain, pancreas and other
parts of the fetus and then inject the cells into a diseased person's organs. Id.
Researchers believe that by injecting the faulty organs of an afflicted patient
with healthy tissue from aborted fetuses, the patient will experience relief
from the disease's symptoms. Id.
23. Bell, supra note 1, at 278. Fetal tissue, as opposed to adult tissue, is
better suited for transplantation because it is in a stage of primitive development and can adapt quickly to a new environment. Id. at 277. Fetal tissue
can replace normal functions of cells where it is transplanted and can regenerate. Id.
24. Id. at 278.
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transplantation.25
Since the legalization of abortion in 1973,26 medical research-27
ers found that fetal tissue obtained from spontaneous abortions
and ectopic pregnancies 28 is generally inadequate for the purpose
of fetal tissue transplantation. 29 Elective abortions provide medical researchers with an almost limitless supply -of fetal tissue. 30
There is also a lower risk of infecting a tissue recipient with genetically-defective tissue. 31 The controversy surrounding abortion,
however, places obstacles in the way of this new medical technology.32
B. The Controversy SurroundingFetal Tissue Research
Federal and state governments regulate the use of fetal tissue.3 Legislatures enacted laws that not only regulate fetal tissue

25. Gelfand & Levin, supra note 3, at 652. Theoretically, researchers could
use fetal tissue obtained from spontaneous abortions and ectopic pregnancies
in tissue transplantation. Id. However, in practice, they do not. Id.
26. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
27. See THE AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION ENCYCLOPEDIA OF MEDICINE
690 (1989) (defining a spontaneous abortion as the loss of the fetus before the
point of viability).
28. See id. at 389 (defining ectopic pregnancy as a pregnancy which develops outside the uterus).
29. Bell, supra note 1, at 279. Researchers have found the above mentioned sources of fetal tissue unsuitable. Id. They reason that by the very nature of such sources, there is an increased probability that the tissue is defective and unusable. Id. A National Institute of Health (NIH) spokesperson
generously estimates that approximately twenty-four fetuses per year can be
used for fetal tissue transplantation from ectopic pregnancies and miscarriages. Id.
30. Gelfand & Levin, supra note 3, at 658. Hospitals and clinics perform
approximately 1.5 million elective abortions annually. Id.
31. Goddard, supra note 14, at 381. Only 3.8 percent of spontaneous abortions provide tissues capable of transplantation. Id. at 381 n.45. Approximately 99 percent of ectopic pregnancies are associated with tubal hemorrhage which causes early organ death in fetuses, making the organs
unsuitable for transplantation. Id.
32. Bell, supra note 1, at 281. In 1992, President Bush vetoed H.R. 2507
which proposed programs for various health research projects, including fetal
tissue research. Id. at 280. One of the President's reasons for vetoing the bill
was "because of its (fetal tissue research using electively aborted fetuses) potential for promoting and legitimating abortion." Id. Subsequently, in January of 1993, President Clinton removed the ban on federal funding of fetal tissue research, stating that he intended to "free science and medicine from the
grasp of politics, and give all Americans access to the very latest and best
medical treatments.'" Id. at 281.
33. Andrews, supra note 21, at 30. Generally, federal regulations defer to
state laws with respect to fetal tissue research on aborted fetuses. Id. However, in 1988, the Secretary of Health and Human Services instituted a moratorium on federal funding of research involving the use of fetal tissue from
elective abortions. Id.
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research, but also the donation of fetal tissue. ' The UAGA, 5 and
state laws in accordance therewith, regulate the donation of fetal
tissue for the purpose of experimentation." Because lawmakers
promulgated the UAGA prior to the advancement of fetal tissue
research, many controversial issues arise with the UAGA's strict
application to this type of research. 7 One such issue is the focus of
this Comment: who should consent to the donation of an aborted
fetus for the purpose of fetal tissue experimentation?
Opponents of the use of fetal tissue from elective abortions
argue that researchers should restrict the type of fetal tissue to fetal tissue obtained from sources other than elective abortions. 38
This argument essentially lays the foundation for the controversy
surrounding the issue of consent with respect to the donation of
aborted fetal tissue. Fetal research adversaries fear that women
who would usually be hesitant to have an abortion may be swayed
toward choosing an abortion because of the possibility of the subsequent beneficial use of fetal tissue.3 9
Those who oppose research on aborted fetuses contend that
because a woman who chooses to have an abortion shows a disregard for the fetus, she should not, in turn, have any legal rights
with respect to the fetus.4" Those opposed to the use of aborted fe34. Gelfand & Levin, supra note 3, at 668.
35. 8A U.L.A. 29-30.
36. Gelfand & Levin, supra note 3, at 671.
37. Id. The drafters of the UAGA created the model act in 1968 to encourage organ donations from adults who made provisions for such donations upon
their death. Id. The drafters did not contemplate donations arising from
elective abortions. Id. The UAGA provides that the decisional-authority lies
with both parents. Id. at 675. However, because of the practical effect of this
provision, decisional-authority, with respect to elective abortions, rests solely
with the aborting woman unless the father is available and objects to the donation. Id.
38. Goddard, supra note 14, at 385. Some opponents contend that the
aborted fetus is a murder victim and since murderers are prohibited by law to
consent to the donation of their victims' organs, the law should not allow an
aborting woman to consent to the donation of the aborted fetus. Id. Other
opponents of such research on electively aborted fetus argue that the aborting
woman abandons her parental role and, therefore, the law should prohibit her
from authorizing such research. Id.
39. Gelfand & Levin, supra note 3, at 660. Opponents contend that the law
should not vest any rights in the aborting woman, including the right to consent to the subsequent donation of and experimentation on the fetus. Id. at
663. Opponents of abortion believe that some women may ultimately justify
their decision to abort because of the lifesaving qualities of the fetal tissue
subsequently obtained therefrom. Id.
40. Andrews, supra note 21, at 48. A national commission studying fetal
research acknowledged that a constitutional violation may occur when
"maternal disqualification" is the basis for allowing a woman to exercise her
right to an abortion. Id. See also Keith v. Daley, 764 F.2d 1265, 1271 (7th
Cir. 1985) (restating that a woman's decision to abort does not in turn make
her an unfit mother for custody purposes if the abortion is unsuccessful and
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tal tissue also argue that any laws requiring the consent of the
aborting woman with respect to fetal research are inappropriate."'
In contrast, it is argued that regulations giving consent authority
to the aborting woman veste in her the same rights afforded to
women who choose to deliver their children and, in effect, give the
fetus a moral status similar to that of a child." In response to this
argument, adversaries of fetal research on voluntarily aborted fetuses contend that the aborting woman should not have dispositional authority comparable to that of a mother who does not
choose to abort because of the inevitable conflict of interest which
arises."
Advocates of fetal tissue research argue that if this research
proves to be as successful as predicted,' elective abortions could
ultimately save as many lives as are lost through the abortions."
the child is in fact born).
41. Andrews, supra note 21, at 48.
42. Sharon Nan Perley, Note, From Control Over One's Body to Control
Over One's Body Parts:Extending the Doctrine of Informed Consent, 67 N.Y.U.
L. REv. 335, 354 (1992). Perley recognizes two possible rationales which lawmakers use in vesting in the aborting woman the right to consent to the donation of the fetal tissue: (1) the fetus has a moral status similar to that of a
child and the woman considers the interests of the aborted fetus in making
such a donation; or, (2) the fetus does not have any status higher than that of
human tissue and the woman, therefore, has a dignitary interest in what
happens to her excised body tissue. Id.
43. Id. In consenting to the fetal research, the aborting woman represents
the fetus to the same extent as a mother of an already-born child. Id. Federal
regulations which allow the aborting woman to consent to the donation of the
fetal tissue for medical research acknowledge, de facto, that the fetus, if capable of consenting, would have an interest in whether or not researchers
used its tissue. Id.
44. Gelfand & Levin, supra note 3, at 676-77. Ethicists argue that a
woman who chooses to abort a fetus should not retain any dispositional
authority, including the right to consent to fetal research, over the fetal remains because she intentionally aborted her fetus. Id. at 677. The authors
argue that there is no conflict of interest because when the abortion is completed, the mother is no longer obligated to bear the fetus and has nothing to
gain. Id. Any effort to deprive the aborting woman of dispositional authority
over the fetus may really be an effort to punish her for aborting. Id.
45. Id. at 650. Scientists estimate that transplantation of fetal tissue could
aid approximately one million Parkinson's victims; two and one half to three
million Alzheimer's disease sufferers; 25,000 Huntington's disease patients;
600,000 Type I diabetics; 400,000 stroke victims; and several hundred thousand persons who have suffered spinal chord injuries. Id. Medical practitioners are currently conducting fetal tissue transplantation research for the
possible treatment of other diseases including sickle cell anemia, leukemia,
and Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS). Id.
46. Id. at 661. Proponents of the use of electively aborted fetal tissue in research argue that those opposed to abortions for ethical reasons should be
willing to benefit from abortions that they ultimately cannot prevent. Id.
Considering the benefits of fetal tissue testing, a delay in the effect on the
abortion issue for a couple of decades does not seem like a plausible reason to
oppose fetal tissue research on ethical grounds. Id. at 661-62.
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Those in favor of fetal tissue research on electively aborted fetuses
also contend that the decision to abort and to subsequently donate
the fetal tissue for research are two separate and distinct choices."7
Proponents, therefore, do not recognize a conflict of interest between the woman and the aborted fetus. The decision to donate
the fetus occurs after the pregnancy ends and the fetus is
aborted." Fetal research supporters conclude, therefore, that at
this point the fetus has no rights independent of the aborting
woman."9 Proponents also support their position by citing common
law, whereby the courts traditionally gave dispositional authority
over a dead body to family members.' Federal and state statutes
also granted the next of kin the right to choose to donate a dead
body for medical research. 5' Notwithstanding the debate surrounding abortion in connection with fetal tissue research, the
UAGA grants an aborting woman the right to consent to donate a
fetus for medical research purposes. 2 The UAGA grants this right
by obtaining the aborting woman's informed consent.'
II. THE DOCTRINE OF INFORMED CONSENT AND THE UNIFORM
ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT

The doctrine of informed consent acknowledges a person's
right to control what happens to his body during his life and upon
his death.' The UAGA incorporates this doctrine into its provisions, and it requires a physician to obtain consent before researchers use a decedent's organs or tissues for research purposes.'
47. See Jonathan Hersey, Comment, Enigma of the Unborn Mother: Legal
and Ethical Considerations of Aborted Fetal Ovarian Tissue and Ova Transplantations,43 UCLA L. REV. 159, 201 (1995) (responding to the argument
that a woman's right to consent to the donation of aborted fetal tissue comes
into conflict with her right to obtain an abortion). Hersey notes that opponents of fetal tissue research argue that there is a conflict of interest, because
the fetus is alive and has rights which can conflict with the aborting mother.
Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 201-02.
50. Id.
51. Id. The right of the family to provide burial for a corpse has never interfered with the family's right to donate the organs of the corpse prior to

burial or cremation. Id.

52. 8A U.L.A. 30.
53. Id.
54. Perley, supra note 42, at 338. The courts have not extended the doctrine of informed consent to require a physician to inform a patient of the proposed use of any of the patient's excised body parts for research purposes. Id.
at 337.
55. See 8A U.L.A. 47 (providing that an individual may consent to the donation of his organs or tissues prior to his death); see also id. at 40-41
(providing that the next of kin may consent to the donation of a decedent's organs or tissues); Perley, supra note 42, at 353 (noting that the UAGA recog-
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Section A discusses the doctrine of informed consent. Section
B examines the use of this doctrine in the UAGA with regard to an
individual's right and the next of kin's right to make an anatomical
gift. Finally, Section C addresses federal and state laws which
supplement the UAGA in connection with the donation of fetuses
for research purposes.
A. Doctrine of Informed Consent
Common law recognizes the doctrine of informed consent. As
a result of this recognition, federal and state statutes incorporate
the doctrine's theories.56 The doctrine is based on an individual's
interest in bodily integrity and his right to self-determination.57
Through the doctrine of informed consent, medical patients or research subjects assess the risks, benefits, and purposes of a particular medical procedure before submitting to it.' Under the doctrine, neither a physician nor a practitioner may take any action
until they fully inform the patient and the patient gives consent.'
Originally, if a physician failed to receive a patient's informed consent, the patient had a cause of action for battery. 60 The majority
of courts have subsequently changed their view on the basis for linizes that a person has an interest in the excised organs or tissues in that the
UAGA allows a person to designate particular uses for which his donated organs or tissues may or may not be used).
56. Perley, supra note 42, at 338. In acknowledging this right, courts hold
that a person's right to self-determination includes a person's right to possession and control of his own body. Id. The doctrine of informed consent acknowledges that "[e]very human being of adult years and sound mind has a
right to determine what shall be done with [her] own body," Id. (citing
Schloendorff v. Soc'y. of N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914)). Furthermore, "each [woman] is considered to be master of [her] own body, and [she]
may... expressly prohibit the performance of lifesaving surgery, or other
medical treatment." Id. (citing Natanson v. Kline, 360 P.2d 1093, 1104 (Kan.
1960)).
57. See Union Pac. Ry. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891) (stating that
no right is more protected than an individual's right to "the possession and
control of his own person, free from all restraint or interference of others,
58. Perley, supra note 42, at 339.
59. Id.
60. William J. McNichols, Informed Consent Liability in a "MaterialInformation" Jurisdiction:What Does the Future Portend?, 48 OKLA. L. REV. 711,
714 (1995). The courts derived the doctrine of informed consent, with regard
to medical treatment, from medical malpractice cases involving the touching
of an individual's body without their consent. Id. McNichols suggests that
allowing a patient to recover under the tort of battery has several advantages.
Id. First, a prima facie battery cause of action did not include proving that
the physician deviated from a medical standard of care. Id. at 715. Second,
the patient did not have to show that he would have forgone treatment if fully
informed of the risks of the procedure. Id. Third, to recover damages the
treatment did not have to lead to bad results. Id. Finally, punitive damages
were available. Id.
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ability61 finding that failing to receive a patient's informed consent
is actually a breach of a professional duty.62 The basis for this
cause of action, therefore, switched from battery to negligence.
Federal regulations extend the doctrine of informed consent
to human experimentation.'
In recognizing the doctrine of informed consent, courts acknowledge that individuals have an interest in their excised organs and tissues and that some individuals would object to the use of their excised organs or tissues for
medical research purposes." The UAGA, by incorporating the doctrine of informed consent, extends the doctrine even further by requiring an individual's consent to use his organs or tissues upon
his death.'
B. The Uniform Anatomical Gift Act
The UAGAU incorporates the doctrine of informed consent
61. Perley, supra note 42, at 341. For a patient to recover, the courts required him to show: (1) the physician failed to fully inform him of the risks
associated with the procedure; (2) his injury was linked to the procedure; and
(3) had he been informed of the risks prior to the procedure, he would not
have consented. Id. Courts generally apply an objective standard to determine causation. Id. Therefore a patient must show that a reasonable person,
while in the same situation as the patient, would not have consented to the
questionable procedure. Id. at 342.
62. See Salgo v. Stanford Univ., 317 P.2d 170, 181 (Cal. 1957) (holding that
the failure to fully inform a patient, and subsequently receive the consent of
the patient, constituted a breach of a professional duty to treat a patient with
due care); see also McNichols, supra note 60, at 715 (noting that courts began
to recognize "inadequate disclosure" as another type of malpractice comparing
it to negligent failure to warn cases).
63. Perley, supra note 42, at 342. The system of rules regulating human
experimentation utilizes the doctrine of informed consent as a means to prevent injury. Id.
64. But cf Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 489 (Cal.
1990) (holding that the plaintiff did not retain property interests in his excised cells and that he could only state a claim for breach of informed consent).
65. 8A U.L.A. 47. Under the UAGA, to determine whether an individual is
an organ donor, the following procedure must be followed:
On or before admission to a hospital, or as soon as possible thereafter, a
person designated by the hospital shall ask each patient who is at least
[18] years of age: "Are you an organ donor or tissue donor?" If the answer is in the affirmative the person shall request a copy of the document of gift. If the answer is negative or there is no answer and the attending physician consents, the person designated shall discuss with
the patient the option to make or refuse to make an anatomical gift.
The answer to the question, an available copy of any document of gift or
refusal to make an anatomical gift, and any other relevant information,
must be placed in the patient's medical record.
Id. Under the UAGA, a "document of gift" is defined as "a card, a statement
attached to or imprinted on a motor vehicle operator's or chauffeur's license, a
will, or other writing used to make an anatomical gift." Id. at 30.
66. Congress promulgated the UAGA in 1968 to provide a set of guidelines
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into its provisions."' All fifty states and the District of Columbia
adopted the UAGA, and, in 1987, several states adopted an
amended version of the Act.' Both versions of the UAGA similarly
govern tissue and organ donation for therapeutic and research
purposes from all dead humans including aborted fetuses."
Under the UAGA," an adult may consent to the donation of
his organs or tissues upon his death.7' In accordance with the doctrine of informed consent, the UAGA also provides that the next of
kin may make an anatomical gift 2 of the organs of a decedent.73
The UAGA defines decedent as a "deceased individual and includes a stillborn infant or fetus." '4
If an individual, prior to his death, neither consents to nor
objects to the donation of his organs, the decisional authority, or
the right to consent to the donation of the decedent's organs or tissues, passes to the next of kin.75 Common law established such
dispositional authority."6 Under common law, family members of a
decedent have "quasi-property" rights77 to a decedent's remains."
in order to promote anatomical gifts within the United States. Hersey, supra
note 47, at 173.
67. 8A U.L.A. 47. Prior to the formation of the UAGA, very little legislation governed organ donation, and what legislation did exist was ambiguous
and contradictory. Hersey, supra note 47, at 173.
68. Id. at 174.
69. Gelfand & Levin, supra note 3, at 671.
70. Under the UAGA, an individual has the right not only to consent to the
donation of his organs or tissues, but also to designate to whom they may be
donated and for what purposes. 8A U.L.A. 47.
71. See also Perley, supra note 42, at 353 (recognizing a person's dignitary
interest by allowing a person the right to donate his organs and designate the
recipient and purpose of the donation).
72. Under the UAGA, an "anatomical gift" is defined as "a donation of all or
part of a human body to take effect upon or after death." 8A U.L.A. 29.
73. 8A U.L.A. 40. See also supra note 55 and accompanying text for a discussion on decisional authority respecting the donation of a decedent's tissues
or organs.
74. As used in the UAGA, "decedent" means "a deceased individual and includes a stillborn infant or fetus." See 8A U.L.A. 29-30.
75. See 8A U.L.A. 40 (discussing the UAGA's hierarchical system of consent).
76. Philippe Ducor, The Legal Status of Human Materials, 44 DRAKE L.
REV. 195, 229 (1996). Originally, American courts adopted the "no property
rule" derived from the British common law with regard to possessory rights in
dead bodies. Id. at 228. Claims by decedent's families instigated the formation of the law concerning biologically dead bodies. Id. at 229.
77. Id. Courts confine the extent of these "quasi-property" rights to a certain bundle of rjghts including the right to possess and guard the decedent's
remains. Id. Other rights included within the scope of these "quasi-property"
rights were:
the right to have the corpse remain in its final resting place, the right to
have it buried where the closest relative wants, the right to refuse an
autopsy, the right to prevent the removal of body parts, and the right to
recover damages for any outrage, indignity, or injury to the body of the
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Traditionally, courts have given these rights to the next of kin for
two purposes. First, the public health requires the speedy burial
of a corpse.7" Moreover, the relatives usually have an emotional
interest in the decedent and guarantee an expedited burial. 0 Second, the relatives of a decedent generally receive some benefit
from the decedent's estate." Therefore, for distributional reasons,
the law logically confers the responsibility of burial to the next of
kin.82
The UAGA adds to the bundle of "quasi-property" rights in a
dead body by giving the decedent's relatives the right to dispose of
the dead body through means other than burial.83 The UAGA, in
effect, gives the relatives the right to act as the decedent's "proxy"
in making an anatomical gift when the decedent leaves no directive concerning his remains. 8 The UAGA provides a hierarchical
system of consent which divides the next of kin into classes.88 Undeceased.
Id.

78. Id. These rights, however, are not constitutionally protected, in that
they symbolize neither a property interest nor a liberty interest. Id. at 230;
see also Georgia Lyons Eye Bank, Inc. v. Lavant, 335 S.E.2d 127, 128 (Ga.
1985) (holding that the right of a mother to bury her daughter without mutilation to her body was not constitutionally protected under the right of privacy).
79. Gelfand & Levin, supra note 3, at 683.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.

83. See Ducor, supra note 76, at 231 (noting that the UAGA allows the next
of kin to make a donation of the decedent's organs or tissues only when the
decedent has not previously made his wishes known); see also Dougherty v.
Mercantile-Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 387 A.2d 244, 246 & n.2 (Md. App. 1978)
(stating that "[flights in a dead body exist ordinarily only for the purposes of
burial...").
84. Bell, supra note 1, at 283. This idea of "proxy consent" assumes that
the individual acting on behalf of the decedent will make a decision in the best
interest of the decedent because of some emotional bond with the decedent.
Id. Bell argues that there are two tests to which a proxy can look to determine the "best interests" of the decedent. Id. The first test is an objective
test whereby the proxy can ascribe the wishes of a "reasonable person" to the
decedent and thereby exercise his best judgment in making the donation. Id.
at 284. The second test is a subjective test known as the "substituted judgment" standard whereby the proxy takes into consideration what the decedent
would have wanted under the circumstances. Id.
85. Id. at 283-84. The law limits an anatomical gift made by a relative to
certain purposes including transplantation, therapy, education, research and
the advancement of science. Id.
86. 8A U.L.A. 40. This system determines which "class" of next of kin is
afforded the decisional authority to donate the decedent's organs or tissues.
Id. This prioritization of classes of the next of kin is as follows: "(1) the spouse
of the decedent; (2) an adult son or daughter of the decedent; (3) either parent
of the decedent; (4) an adult brother or sister of the decedent; (5) a grandparent of the decedent; and (6) a guardian of the decedent at the time of death."
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der this system, the donation of a fetus will be effected by the consent of "either parent."87 According to a provision of the UAGA, if
both parents are available, one parent is allowed to object to the
donation by withholding their consent.8 The UAGA, however,
does not distinguish between the donation of fetuses resulting
from spontaneous abortions and ectopic pregnancies, and the donation of fetuses resulting from elective abortions.89 Because of the
sensitive nature of the abortion issue and its connection to fetal
tissue research, federal and state legislatures have enacted laws
which supplement the UAGA, thus providing additional regulation
of fetal tissue research.
C. Federal and State Law

In addition to the UAGA, federal and state legislatures have
also embraced the doctrine of informed consent. The legislatures
adopted laws which include consent provisions and regulate the
donation of and research on fetal tissue.' In 1973, the National Institute of Health (the "NIH") proposed guidelines for fetal tissue
research.8 ' These guidelines assisted in the formation of the National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research (the "Commission").92 In 1975,
Congress passed laws created by the Commission to regulate fed-

87. Gelfand & Levin, supra note 3, at 672. Because a fetus is not married
nor has children, "either parent" will effectuate the donation. Id. at 672
n.146. The consent of one parent and the non-objection or non-notification of
the other is also needed to effectuate the donation. Id. at 672. However, the
father cannot be expected to object to the donation if he is not notified. Id.
There does not currently appear to be a notification requirement in the
UAGA. Id.
88. See 8A U.L.A. 41 (stating that an anatomical gift may not be made if
the person in the class proposing to make the anatomical gift knows of an objection to the making of the gift by another member of the same or prior
class).
89. See 8A U.L.A. 29-30 (including stillborn infants or fetuses within the
definition of "decedent").
90. See generally Hersey, supra note 47, at 169-81. (noting that currently
federal regulations do not prohibit the use of aborted fetuses for fetal research). To some extent federal law and some state laws require consent of
the aborting woman to the donation of fetal tissue. Id. Federal laws extend
only to research funded by the federal government. Cory Zion, The Legal and
Ethical Issues of Fetal Tissue Research and Transplantation,75 OR. L. REV.

1281, 1289-91. However, the stated adopted UAGA regulates fetal tissue research at the state level and applies to any such research regardless of
whether it is federally funded. Id.
91. Hersey, supra note 47, at 170. Concerns that fetal research would increase the number of abortions prompted the federal regulation covering this
research. Id.
92. Id. The Commission discussed the advantages and disadvantages of
federally funded fetal tissue research. Id. at 171. It also reviewed the testimony and philosophical opinions about the ethics involved. Id.
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erally funded research on fetal tissue. 3 The Commission determined, inter alia," that in order for fetal tissue research to qualify
for federal funding, the researchers must first obtain the informed
consent of the mother along with the non-objection of the father. 5
However, for fetal tissue research which is not federally funded,
federal laws defer to state and local laws."
All fifty states have adopted a version of the UAGA." Approximately half of the states, however, have chosen to supplement the UAGA with laws that specifically address issues revolving around the use of fetal tissue for research." Of these states
which have chosen to further regulate the use of fetal tissue research, roughly half have laws requiring the consent of the aborting woman prior to the donation and subsequent use of the fetus."
Although these supplementary laws exist, the controlling law with
respect to the donation of fetal tissue for research purposes is still
the state-adopted UAGA.'"
Because lawmakers created the UAGA prior to the legalization of abortion and the revolution of fetal tissue research, the
UAGA does not take into consideration the donation of fetuses
from elective abortions. 1 1 The UAGA assumes that both parents
93. Id.
94. Id. at 171. The Commission also determined that for fetal tissue to
qualify for federal funding the research must have the approval of local institutional review boards. Id.
95. Id.
96. See 45 C.F.R. § 46.210 (1996) (providing that "[aictivities involving the
dead fetus, macerated fetal material, or cells, tissue, or organs excised from a
dead fetus shall be conducted only in accordance with any applicable state or
local laws regarding such activities").
97. See supra note 8 for a breakdown of the number of states which
adopted the UAGA in its original and amended forms.
98. Helen M. Maroney, Bioethical Catch-22: The Moratorium on Federal
Funding of Fetal Tissue TransplantationResearch and the NIH Revitalization
Amendments, 9 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 485, 490 (1993). These laws

regulate experimentation, disposition, sale and transportation of fetal tissue
used in medical research. Id. Generally, these laws are restrictive in nature
and pertain to the use of fetal tissue obtained from elective abortions. See
Zion, supra note 90, at 1289-91; see also Hersey, supra note 47, at 179
(discussing various state laws which restrict experimentation on fetal remains). See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-2302 A (West 1993) (prohibiting
the use of "[any] human fetus or embryo resulting from an induced abortion ... for any medical experimentation... except as is strictly necessary to
diagnose a disease or condition in the mother of the fetus ... and only if the
abortion was performed because of such disease or condition").
99. Maroney, supra note 98, at 489. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-17802(b)(2) (Michie 1991) (requiring a mother's consent).
100. Maroney, supra note 98, at 489. Maroney also states that it appears
that hospitals and clinics performing abortions are failing to effectuate the
donation of fetal tissue in accordance with the UAGA. Id. at 489-90.
101. Gelfand & Levin, supra note 3, at 671. The authors state that the application of the UAGA to organ donation of electively aborted fetuses gives
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will be known and available to give their consent. 1°2 In practice,
however, this provision does not effect fetuses from voluntary
abortions. If the father is not available to give his consent prior to
the donation of an aborted fetus, the hospital or clinic simply considers him unavailable. 3 For all practical purposes, they deem
the consent of the aborting mother to be sufficient." ' Here lies the
problem with regard to the application of the UAGA to electively
aborted fetuses.
III. THE EFFECT OF THE APPLICATION OF THE UAGA TO ABORTED
FETAL TIssuE
The UAGA does not take into consideration the effect of elective abortions or the fetal tissue resulting therefrom."5 Hence,
lawmakers interpreted the UAGA to imply that doctors should afford an aborting woman the decisional authority with regard to the
disposition of fetal remains." The UAGA provides that either
parent of the decedent may consent to the donation of the decedent's organs or tissues with the non-objection of the other parent.'0 7 However for practical reasons, the doctor will give an
aborting woman alone this decisional authority in accordance with
the provisions of the UAGA and applicable state laws.0 8 To some,
however, simply affording such a right because it is the only
"practical" solution seems inappropriate and to some extent disturbing.'0° Before lawmakers automatically grant this right to the
aborting woman, however, it is necessary to discern whether the
UAGA applies to the donation of aborted fetal tissue. Section A
discusses whether the common law purposes for granting the next
of kin dispositional authority under the UAGA extend to the donation of electively aborted fetuses. Section B analyzes the
UAGA's language and concludes that the UAGA does not include
an aborting woman as a potential donor of fetal remains.

rise to many unique problems. Id.
102. Id. at 672. The UAGA states that "either parent" of the decedent may
make an anatomical gift. 8A U.L.A. 40.
103. Id. The consent of one parent and the non-objection or non-notification
of the other is needed to effectuate donation of an electively aborted fetus. Id.
The father cannot be expected, however, to object to the donation if he is not

notified. Id. There does not appear to be a notification requirement in the
UAGA. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 669.
106. Id.

107. See 8A U.L.A. 41 (explaining why one parent cannot donate a decedent's organs if the other parent objects).
108. Gelfand & Levin, supra note 3, at 672.
109. See supra notes 38-44 and accompanying text for a discussion on argu-

ments against the use of electively aborted fetal tissue for research purposes.
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A. Purposesfor the UAGA Grantingthe Family the Right to
Consent to Donation

The UAGA incorporates into its provisions the common law
reasoning10 for granting the right of dispositional authority over a
dead body to the next of kin."' The common law view protected
the public health and the financial interests of the family and the
decedent. These bases for granting the next of kin dispositional
authority, however, are now unnecessary and inapplicable with respect to electively aborted fetuses.
The first reason the common law afforded the next of kin this
dispositional authority was to safeguard the public health."' However, this safeguard is not needed with respect to aborted fetuses,
because clinics properly dispose of fetal remains in accordance
with state laws."' Several of these laws provide that the fetus be
disposed of in a sanitary and appropriate manner.14 The states
enacted these laws to automatically safeguard the public health."5
Because state laws provide for the disposal of fetal remains, it is
not necessary to grant an aborting woman the common law dispositional authority, traditionally granted to the next of kin, over the
fetal remains. "'

The second reason for affording the next of kin dispositional
authority under the common law was because the next of kin were
likely to take responsibility for the financial affairs of the dece110. See Ducor, supra note 76, at 229 (stating that the common law affords
dispositional authority to the next of kin because of claims to the dead bodies
by the decedent's family).
111. Id. at 231 (discussing the donative authority of the next of kin under
the UAGA).
112. Id. Aside from allowing the next of kin to make a donation of the decedent's organs or tissues only when the decedent has not previously made his
wishes known, the UAGA grants quasi-property rights to the next of kin in
order to bury the deceased. Id.
113. Gelfand & Levin, supra note 3, at 676. Following an elective abortion,
the woman leaves the aborted fetus with the hospital or clinic in which the
abortion was performed and it is disposed of therefrom. Id.
114. Terry, supra note 2, at 427. Terry notes that various disposal statutes
may be found unconstitutional if such statutes are found to unduly burden or
"otherwise chill" a woman's right to have an abortion. Id. at 428.
115. Id. Courts recognize the inherent interest in state's need to dispose
fetal remains; see, e.g., City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, Inc.,
462 U.S. 416, 451 & n.45 (1983) (finding that, although the state had a legitimate interest in enacting the disposal statute, the statute was impermissibly
vague).
116. Terry, supra note 2, at 428. A federal court suggested that statutes
which require that the hospital or clinic notify an aborting woman of the
means of disposal, or requiring her to designate the means of disposal, may be
constitutionally defective if they impose a direct burden on her abortion decision. Id. at 429; see also Margaret S. v. Edwards, 488 F. Supp. 181, 222 (E.D.
La. 1980) (holding that the state's disposal statute imposed psychological burdens on the pregnant woman's decision to have an abortion).
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dent's estate and would be included as beneficiaries to the estate.
Therefore, they would assure that the last wishes of the decedent
were granted.117 It is easy to assess that this rationale is without
effect with respect to aborted fetuses. A aborted fetus does not
have any last wishes. A aborted fetus has not acquired any property and therefore does not have an estate or beneficiaries to look
after that estate. Unlike the next of kin of a decedent, the aborting
woman will not receive any economic benefit from the death of the
fetus. 118

By allowing relatives to consent to the donation of a decedent's remains, 9 the UAGA incorporates the common law purposes for affording dispositional authority to the next of kin. Because the common law reasons for affording this authority are now
without effect, with respect to aborted fetuses, those interpreting
the UAGA should not extend such rights to aborting women. It
can also be argued that, as the UAGA currently reads, a woman
who electively aborts a fetus is not a potential donor.
B. Language of the UAGA

States have recently interpreted the UAGA to afford aborting
women the right to consent to the donation of electively aborted
fetuses. 20 The UAGA does not, however, by its very own language,
necessarily afford her this right. 2' Before extending the UAGA to
include a woman's donation of an electively aborted fetus, it is necessary to find such language in the UAGA which conclusively
permits such a donation. An argument can be made that the language of the UAGA does not include a woman who electively
aborts a fetus as not a potential donor.
Under the UAGA, a person can make an anatomical gift of a
fetus. ' The UAGA provides that "either parent" may consent to
the making of an anatomical gift. 2 In reading the language of this
section and applying it to electively aborted fetuses, the first as-

117. See Ducor, supra note 76, at 229 (stating that courts have defined
"quasi-property rights" in a dead body as the bundle of rights associated with
possessing and guarding the decedent's remains).
118. Bell, supra note 1, at 282; see also 8A U.L.A. 58 (prohibiting an aborting woman from receiving compensation for the fetal tissue by providing that
"a person may not knowingly, for valuable consideration, purchase or sell a
part for transplantation or therapy, if removal of the part is intended to occur
after the death of the decedent").
119. See supra note 86 and accompanying text for a discussion on the dispositional authority of the next of kin under the UAGA.
120. Gelfand & Levin, supra note 3, at 671-72.
121. See generally id. (discussing the effect of the application of the UAGA
to elective abortions).
122. See 8A U.L.A. 40.
123. See id. (discussing which "class" under the UAGA will effectuate the
donation of a fetus).
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sumption requires that the aborting woman is in fact a "parent" of
the aborted fetus. Section 3(b)(2) of the UAGA also provides that
"either parent" may not make an anatomical gift if "the [parent]
proposing to make an anatomical gift knows of a refusal or contrary indications by the decedent." 2' This language makes a second assumption that, because the fetus is incapable of consenting
to or refusing to make such a gift, the aborting
woman will act in
125
its best interest in consenting to the donation.
Because the UAGA fails to define "parent,"2 ' the first assumption needed to apply the UAGA to electively aborted fetuses
is that the aborting woman is indeed a "parent."'27 For the first assumption, the "parent," who carries the fetus, would have to be the
"mother." The legal definition of "mother" is a woman who has
borne a child, a female parent, and includes maternity during the
pre-birth period. 128 In applying this definition, one can easily deduce that a woman who chooses to abort a fetus is not, in the traditional meaning of the word, a mother. She did not intend to
carry the fetus to term nor has she borne a child." Although the
definition of mother also includes the pre-birth period, there cannot be a "pre-birth" if there is never going to be a "birth." However, it can be argued that before the pregnant woman makes the
decision to abort, there is a pre-birth period and that the woman is
therefore, for the purposes of the UAGA, a parent. This argument,
however, is flawed because the decision to donate the fetus is made
subsequent to the decision to abort. 3 ' At this point in time, when
the definitions under the UAGA become applicable, the intent of
the woman to not carry the fetus to term is apparent.'s'
.For purposes of the argument, if it is assumed that the
aborting woman is the parent of the aborted fetus, a second assumption must still be made for the UAGA to apply to electively
aborted fetuses. In applying the UAGA to electively aborted fetuses, the aborting woman must not know of any objections on the
part of the fetus to the anatomical gift.'' This assumption seems

124. See id. at §§ 40-41 (providing that the next of kin may not make an

anatomical gift of the decedent's remains if they know of any indications of
the decedent to the contrary).
125. Maroney, supra note 98, at 515.
126. Bell, supra note 1, at 283.
127. 8A U.L.A. 40.
128. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1013 (6th ed. 1990).

129. Bell, supra note 1, at 283. In aborting the fetus the mother has chosen
not to become a parent. Id. Since she made an affirmative decision to terminate the pregnancy, she may very well resent being referred to as a mother or
parent. Id.
130. Maroney, supra note 98, at 500.

131. Gelfand & Levin, supra note 3, at 671. The UAGA is inapplicable to
donations from live persons. Id.
132. Bell, supra note 1, at 283.
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absurd because the fetus is incapable of either objecting or consenting.13 The language of the UAGA also provides, however, that
"either parent" of the decedent is prohibited from making the anatomical gift if they know of contrary indications of the decedent."
By allowing either parent to consent to the anatomical gift of
a fetus, the UAGA assumes that the parent of the decedent will act
in the best interest of the decedent.' It seems natural to assume
that a mother, or a pregnant woman with every intention of carrying a fetus to term and delivering a child, would necessarily act in
the best interests of her child or fetus. 36 However, allowing a
woman who aborted a fetus to subsequently act as agent for the
fetus, and making the assumption that the woman is capable of
acting in the best interests" 7 of the fetus, does not seem so natural."' The response to this statement is that just because a woman
chooses to abort a fetus does not mean she necessarily shows a disregard for the fetus, nor does she extinguish any rights she may
possess.'39 Therefore, the law should allow her to subsequently act
as agent for the fetus for the purposes of the UAGA. " The laws
fetal tissue research potentially implicates are currently unclear
and contradictory with regard to what dispositional rights, if any,
a woman may have over the aborted fetal remains." However,
until the law establishes such rights, a reasonable alternative to
the aborting woman as the vicarious decision-maker in the donation process is necessary to promote the advancement of fetal tissue research.

133. Id. Evidence of a fetus' consent or objection to the donation of its tissue
does not exist. Id.
134. Gelfand & Levin, supra note 3, at 672. Either parent will effectuate the
donation of an anatomical gift. Id. The consent of one parent and the nonobjection or non-notification of the other is also needed to effectuate the donation. Id.; see also 8A U.L.A. 41 (stating that an anatomical gift may not be
made if the person in the class proposing to make the anatomical gift knows of

an objection to the making of the gift by another member of the same or prior
class).
135. Maroney, supra note 98, at 515.

136. Gelfand & Levin, supra note 3, at 676.
137. See generally Bell, supra note 1, at 284-85 (discussing the traditional

models of proxy decision in connection with the UAGA).
138. Id. at 283. It is debatable whether an aborting woman indicates that
she has no further interests in a fetus, let alone an interest in acting as agent
for a fetus whose life she chose to terminate. Id.

139. Id.
140. See Perley, supra note 42, at 354 (stating that the right to consent to

the donation of fetal tissue should vest with the aborting woman because the
fetus has a moral status similar to a child and the fetus is human tissue and
part of the woman's body).
141. Terry, supra note 2, at 432. The law is unclear as to any possessory
rights to the aborted fetus in the event of non-disposal. Id.
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IV. REASONABLE ALTERNATIVE TO AN ABORTING WOMAN'S CONSENT
I TO DONATION OF FETAL TISSUE

State legislatures should regulate the use of fetal tissue in
medical research by enacting legislation separate and distinct from
the UAGA. Currently, the states provide statutes which regulate
the disposal of aborted fetuses. "2 States have the authority to incorporate into such statutes a provision which would allow the
state the option of using the fetal tissue, without the consent of the
aborting woman, for the purpose of maintaining and improving the
public health."3 If this authority is used, the states could then
permit researchers to use fetal tissue in research for the sole purpose of advancing medical technology to promote the health of the
general public.
The government could police the endeavor by requiring researchers, hospitals and clinics involved in the research to be licensed by the state. The licensing requirement would allow the
state to monitor the transfer of aborted fetal tissue. This proposed
provision could also prohibit hospitals and clinics from receiving
any compensation for the transfer of fetal tissue to ensure the integrity of the research. A state should also require that researchers petition the state for a research license. The researchers would
submit proposals to a state-created review board indicating the
methods, purposes, and overall benefits of such research. If these
proposals meet the state's standards, a petitioner would become
licensed and could then proceed with the proposed research.
States will be promoting the growth of valuable research."
and a legitimate state interest "5 by including the proposed provision in their disposal statutes. The proposal would necessarily do
away with the requirement that an aborting woman consent to the
donation of fetal tissue prior to researchers using such tissue. "6
142. Id. at 427. Following Roe v. Wade, states enacted laws addressing the
disposal of fetuses from elective abortions. Id. at 427-29; see, e.g., FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 390.001(7) (West 1993) (providing that "fetal remains shall be disposed
of in a sanitary and appropriate manner in accordance with standard health
practices, as provided by rule of the Department of Health and Rehabilitative
Services").
143. See Terry, supra note 2, at 428 (noting that at common law, a state's
interest in maintaining the public health included the disposal of dead bodies); see, e.g., Wyeth v. Thomas, 86 N.E. 925, 927 (1909) (holding that there is
no question that the state has the power to exercise control over the disposal
of the dead).

144. See supra notes 17-23 and accompanying text for a discussion on the

benefits of fetal tissue research.
145. See Terry, supra note 2, at 428 (stating that when the state regulates

the disposal of dead bodies, it maintains the public health).
146. See Bell, supra note 1, at 283. The states ultimately have a legitimate
interest in the effect of the transfer of aborted fetal tissue on the public in
general and ensuring that fetal tissue research does not become commercialized.

Jacquelyn F. Sedlak, Fetal Tissue Transplantation:Regulating the
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By eliminating the consent requirement, states will eliminate the
possibility of any incentive for a woman to abort for monetary
gain,417 any incentive of a health practitioner encouraging abortion
for the purposes of advancing their own research,"8 and any incentive of a woman to abort in an effort to donate the tissue to a
specified person or research endeavor. " 9 By not requiring her consent, a provision such as the one proposed, will not violate her
fundamental right to privacy,'O which includes a woman's right to
terminate a pregnancy.151
Currently, courts hold that any law which creates an undue
burden' on a woman's decision to have an abortion is unconstitutional.l" Courts also find that certain statutes which require a
woman to determine the method of the aborted fetus' disposal
continue to impose an undue burden on her.'" As with the majority of current fetal disposal statutes, the proposal will not require
any decision on the part of the aborting woman with respect to the
means of disposal. Therefore, the proposal does not impose an undue burden on her decision to abort. The proposed provision is
neutral as to the issue of abortion, and lawmakers will not promulgate the provision to dissuade pregnant women from seeking an
abortion. ' ' Since the current UAGA ineffectively regulates the
Medical Hope for the Future, 4 J.L. & HEALTH 57, 75 (1990).
147. Id. at 73.

148. Zion, supra note 90, at 1286.
149. Sedlak, supra note 146, at 77.
150. See June Coleman, Playing God or Playing Scientist: A Constitutional
Analysis of State Laws Banning Embryological Procedures,27 PAC. L.J. 1331,

1363 (1996) (stating that "[flundamental rights should include liberty interests which society has traditionally protected, according to the plurality opinion"); see also Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 122-24 (1989)
(recognizing the right to privacy in several areas, including reproductive
choice, marital relationships, family relationships, child rearing and education).
151. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153-54 (1973) (holding that the state's

interest in a fetus prior to viability does not outweigh a woman's interest such
that an abortion may be prohibited).
152. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S.Ct. 2791, 2821 (1992) (holding that
an "undue burden" is one whose "purpose or effect is to place a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion before the fetus attains vi-

ability"). See also Valerie J. Pacer, Salvaging the Undue Burden StandardIs It a Lost Cause? The Undue Burden Standard and Fundamental Right
Analysis, 73 WASH. U.L.Q. 295, 295 (1995).

153. Pacer, supra note 152, at 306. In Planned Parenthood v. Casey the

"undue burden" standard of review replaced the traditional strict scrutiny
test. Id. (citing PlannedParenthood,112 S.Ct. 2791).
154. See Margaret S. v. Edwards, 488 F. Supp. 181, 222 (E.D. La. 1980)

(holding that the state's disposal statute imposed psychological burdens on
the pregnant woman's decision to have an abortion). See also Terry, supra

note 2, at 429 (discussing the holding in MargaretS.v. Edwards).
155. See Pacer, supra note 152, at 307 (noting that the Court in Roe v. Wade
acknowledged that a state could interfere with a fundamental right for the
purposes of pursuing a value-neutral health objective).
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donation of aborted fetal tissue for medical research," a provision
such as the one proposed can effectively regulate the research with
a consent requirement for the sole purpose of promoting the public
health through the use of new medical technology.
CONCLUSION

Traditionally, the common law vested in the next of kin the
right to dispose of a dead body. The UAGA fails in its attempt to
extend this right to aborting women for the purposes of donating
fetal remains for research. Due to the UAGA's language and its
intended purposes, the UAGA affords an aborting woman the right
to consent. Lawmakers have only applied the UAGA to the donation of aborted fetal tissue in an effort to facilitate fetal tissue research. The states currently have statutes which regulate the disposal of aborted fetal remains. States can effectively regulate
aborted fetal tissue research by incorporating into such statutes a
provision whereby the states can regulate aborted fetal tissue
without a woman's consent. The provision would provide a state
with the power to determine if the tissue will be used in research
for the benefit of the public's health and will not impose an undue
burden on a woman's decision to obtain an abortion.

156. See generally Gelfand & Levin, supra note 3, at 671-72 (discussing the
ineffective application of the UAGA to aborted fetal tissue).

